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Consent is Not a Defense to Battery: A Reply to 
Professor Bergelson 
Luis E. Chiesa· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In her recent book, Professor Vera Bergelson expressed puzzlement over the 
fact that those who feel "trapped in the wrong body" can "consent to a sex change 
operation, which often involves the removal of healthy sexual organs," whereas 
those who would feel happier being amputees "cannot consent to amputation of an 
arm or a leg.,,1 Bergelson is equally puzzled by the fact that a spouse may 
physically injur~ her partner pursuant to practices of religious flagellation, but she 
may not cause similar injuries pursuant to sadomasochistic sexual practices.2 Why 
is consent a defense to battery when surgery is performed to remove the sexual 
organs of someone who desires to look like a member of the opposite sex but not 
when it is performed to sever the leg of someone who desires to look like an 
amputee? Why is consent a defense to battery when the victim wants to be injured 
during a religious ritual but not when she wants to suffer pain while engaging in 
sadomasochistic sex? Why, in sum, is consent a defense to certain types of 
batteries but not to others? 
Professor Bergelson's answer is that the law's current approach to consent is 
uncertain, outdated and arbitrary.3 Thus, she argues that current rules "need to be 
revised" in accordance with a more coherent theory of consent, pursuant to which 
the victim's freely given and valid consent should always be considered a defense 
that (fully or partially) mitigates the perpetrator's liability.4 Bergelson then 
devotes several sections of her insightful book to explaining when and how 
consent should reduce or eliminate the defendant's responsibility for engaging in 
physically harmful conduct.5 
Although I sympathize with Bergelson's plea for a more robust consent 
defense in criminal law, I am puzzled by her puzzlement over the way in which the 
Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I am indebted to Vera Bergelson, Markus 
Dubber, and Leo Zaibert for providing me valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this essay. I am 
also indebted to Tony Dilloffor our conversations on the nature of consent during the 2010 Law and 
Society meeting in Chicago. 
VERA BERGELSON, VICfIMS' RIGHTS AND VICTIMS' WRONGS: COMPARATIVE LIABILITY IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 24 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2009). 
2 /d. at 21-22. 
3 Id. at 26. 
4 Id. at 26-27. 
SId. at 15-27,93-105. 
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law currently draws the lines between lawful and unlawful conduct in this context. 
The purpose of this brief essay is to explain why I believe that the aforementioned 
cases are not really puzzling at all. I will do so by arguing that, properly 
understood, consent is never a defense to battery.6 More specifically, I contend 
that consent defeats criminal liability only in two circumstances, neither of which 
operates as a "true defense,,7 to liability. In the first group of cases, consent 
defeats liability when it negates an element of the offense. Thus, the victim's 
consent negates the non-consensual nature of the sexual intercourse in the case of 
rape. Similarly, the victim's consent negates the unlawful nature of the taking of 
the property of another in the case of theft. In such cases, consent is not really a 
defense that defeats liability for engaging in harmful conduct, but rather a negation 
of an element of the offense that reveals that the perpetrator did not engage in 
harmful conduct in the first place. 
In other cases, consent precludes liability for conduct that nominally satisfies 
the elements of an offense when, in combination with other factors, it reveals that 
the perpetrator's act did not inflict the kind of evil that the offense with which he 
was charged was designed to prevent. In such cases, consent amounts to a factor 
that counts in favor of modifying the definition of the offense in a way that reveals 
that the perpetrator's conduct does not really fall within the scope of the prohibited 
conduct.s Thus, the victim's consent to having her ears pierced, in conjunction 
with other factors-such as the fact that the procedure is carried out by a licensed 
professional-reveals that the defendant's act does not inflict the kind of harm 
sought to be prevented by the offense. So conceived, consent does not count as a 
defense to conduct that inflicted the kind of evil represented by the offense, but 
rather as a factor that contributes to modifying the definition of the offense in way 
that reveals that the defendant's conduct did not inflict a legally relevant evil in the 
first place. Bergelson's puzzlement stems, I believe, from her failure to consider 
that consent might operate in this fashion. For Bergelson, as for most criminal 
theorists, consensual conduct that satisfies the elements of an offense is lawful 
because, in such cases, consent operates as a justification defense. According to 
this approach, the procedure of puncturing a part of the human body to create an 
I believe that this claim can be generalized. Thus, I think that, properly understood, 
consent is not a defense to any crime, including homicide. However, I chose to focus on consent's 
relevance to battery liability in this essay because other cases, especially homicide, raise thorny 
issues unrelated to the substantive doctrine of consent. In cases of homicide, for example, proving 
the victim's consent to death is compounded by the fact that the victim is no longer alive and able to 
testify. 
By "true defense" I mean a claim that defeats liability without negating that the defendant 
engaged in conduct that satisfied the elements of the offense charged. There are three kinds of "true 
defenses," namely: justifications, excuses, and non-exculpatory defenses. See generally Paul H. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199 (1982). 
8 Professor Robinson calls this kind of "defense" an "offense-modification defense," because 
it is intended to alter or modify the definition of the offense in a way that allows the defendant to 
claim that his conduct did not satisfy the elements of the "modified" offense. Id. at 208-\3. 
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opening in which jewelry may be worn causes physical harm and is, therefore, 
harmful in a legally relevant way. However, the victim's consent justifies the 
conduct because her interest in freely deciding what to do with her own body 
outweighs the physical harm caused by the procedure.9 
Once consent to battery is viewed as a justification, one can begin to 
understand why Bergelson is puzzled by the consistent refusal of courts to 
exculpate those who engage in consensual sadomasochistic sexual practices and 
those medical professionals who amputate a leg at the request of the patient in 
order to treat body dismorphic disorder. If consent justifies physically injurious 
acts because the harmful effects of the conduct are outweighed by the value that 
we place on the victim's freedom to decide what to do with her body, then it is 
difficult to explain why the victim's informed and freely-given consent to harm 
provides a defense to battery in some cases but not in others. After all, if consent 
is a defense to battery because we value the victim's autonomy even more than we 
value her physical integrity, then consistency demands that we treat voluntary and 
informed consent as defense in any case of battery. 
Although this view has some normative appeal, I believe that it fails to 
accurately describe the relevance of consent to our current practices of blaming 
and punishing. Furthermore, I believe that treating consent as a justification is not 
only descriptively problematic, but also conceptually flawed. Thus, I argue that 
for the sake of conceptual clarity, consent should either be treated as irrelevant to 
criminal liability or as a factor that ought to be taken into account when 
determining whether the defendant's conduct inflicted the kind of evil that the 
offense was designed to prevent. Finally, I think that it is because of these 
descriptive and conceptual misunderstandings that scholars such as Bergelson have 
incorrectly pointed out that our current criminal laws approach the issue of consent 
in a haphazard fashion. I will defend these claims in three parts. 
In Part II, I argue that there are three ways of conceiving the interest sought to 
be protected by the offense of battery. These approaches provide different 
accounts of the exculpatory nature of consent in battery cases, none of which is 
compatible with the claim that consent operates as a justification defense. In Part 
III, I argue that, contrary to what many scholars contend, the offense of battery 
does not seek to protect personal autonomy. Therefore, I claim that the 
exculpatory role of consent in cases of battery cannot be explained by claiming 
that recognizing consent as a defense vindicates the victim's autonomy. Instead, I 
suggest that consent is relevant only insofar as it reveals that the infliction of 
bodily harm was socially acceptable. In Part IV, I argue that consent to battery 
currently operates as a factor that modifies the definition of the offense in a way 
that demonstrates that the defendant did not engage in the type of conduct that the 
9 A justification is a defense that defeats liability for conduct that inflicted a legally relevant 
harm that is to be avoided whenever possible. Id. at 213. However, the defendant is relieved of 
responsibility because the justifying circumstances reveal that the harm caused by the actor is 
"outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest." Id. 
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legislature desired to prohibit as battery. Furthermore, I claim that the offense of 
battery seeks to prevent the infliction of non-trivial physical harm in circumstances 
where the infliction of such harm is not considered a normal occurrence given 
current societal practices. Consequently, I suggest that consent is relevant in cases 
of battery only when, in conjunction with other factors, it reveals that the 
perpetrator's infliction of bodily harm was a normal occurrence rather than an 
extraordinary or regrettable event. 
II. A FIRST GLANCE AT THE INTEREST THAT BATTERY SEEKS TO PROTECT 
A. Societal Interest in Keeping the Citizenry Free from the Infliction of Bodily 
Harm 
Most criminal codes divide the offenses contained in the code by virtue of the 
harm that the law seeks to prevent by creating those crimes. For example, the 
Model Penal Code groups crimes into, among other categories, "offenses against 
the person" and "offenses against property." The offenses of homicide and battery 
are classified as "offenses against the person," whereas arson and criminal 
mischief are included within the group "offenses against property." But what is it 
that we mean when we say that battery is an offense against the person? One 
possible answer is that battery counts as an offense against the person because 
engaging in conduct constitutive of the offense infringes a societal interest in 
keeping persons free from physical harm. Under this view of the offense, any act 
that inflicts physical injury to a person instantiates the kind of harm sought to be 
prevented by the offense of battery. Furthermore, if what we really mean to 
protect is the citizen's physical integrity-as opposed to her freedom to do what 
she wants with her body-then the interest sought to be protected by the offense is 
infringed whenever someone physically injures the person regardless of whether 
the person wanted to be physically injured. After all, the physical harm suffered 
by the victim is not erased by her consent. 
B. Personal Interest in Having the Freedom to Decide What to Do with Our 
Bodies 
Alternatively, the harm sought to be prevented by the offense of battery may 
be conceived as the interference with the individual's freedom to do what she 
wants with her body. Conceived in this manner, the harm sought to be prevented 
by the offense of battery is not the infliction of physical harm to the body, but 
rather the interference with the individual's freedom to do as she wishes with her 
own body. Accordingly, an act that inflicts bodily injury does not necessarily 
count as an instantiation of the type of harm sought to be prevented by the creation 
of the offense of battery. Thus, an act consisting in the puncturing of the skin with 
a needle would not count as inflicting the harm sought to be prevented by the 
offense of battery unless the victim did not wish her skin to be punctured by the 
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needle. The reason for this is straightforward. If the real interest sought to be 
protected by the offense of battery is the individual's freedom to decide what to do 
with her body, then the puncturing of the skin does not count as the sort of harm 
that the offense was intended to prevent unless the person did not acquiesce to it. 
So conceived, the rights of the individuals are only infringed when they do not 
consent to the harmful conduct. After all, if what is really protected in these cases 
is the right of the individual to do what she wants with her body-as opposed to 
the societal interest to protect physical integrity-then it follows that hanning such 
interests with the victim's acquiescence does not infringe her right to do as she 
wishes with her bodily interests. 
This view of rights is in tension with the often-defended view that the victim's 
consent to injury relieves the perpetrator of liability for battery because it reveals 
that the victim waived her right to bodily integrity.1O Under the view of rights 
espoused in this section, people have a right to do whatever they want with their 
body rather than a right to be kept free from harm to their body. Therefore, by 
consenting to suffer bodily modifications they are not, as the consent-as-waiver 
scholars would argue, waiving their right to be kept free from harm, but rather 
exercising their right to do whatever they want to do with their body. Thus, under 
this conception, the victim who consents to the body alteration is not harmed at all 
when the tattoo artist punctures her skin with a needle. Given that the interest 
sought to be protected by the offense is not interfered with in any way in cases of 
consensual conduct, there is no need to compare the benefits reaped by the conduct 
with the harm caused by the conduct because there simply is no harm in need of 
justification in the first place. Therefore, under this conception, consent does not 
justify the victim's conduct. Instead, it negates the harmful nature of the act. 
c. Individual Interest in Being Kept Free From Harm 
Some criminal law scholars have argued that the interest sought to be 
protected by the offense of battery is the individual's right to be kept free from 
harm rather than the societal interest in protecting the citizenry from bodily harm 
or the personal interest in freely deciding what to do with one's body.ll Under this 
view, individuals have an interest to be kept free from injury to their physical 
integrity. However, they can choose to waive such an interest by consenting to 
conduct that causes them physical harm. The waiver, however, does not erase the 
harm caused. The victim is still harmed when the tattoo artist punctures her skin 
with a needle, even if she consented to getting a tattoo. 12 The hann, however, is 
10 This is the view defended by BERGELSON, supra note I, at 94. 
It See id. at 91. 
12 Perhaps those who defend the view that consent functions as a justification would object to 
the claim that the tattoo artist harms the victim when she punctures her skin with the needle. If, 
however, they claim that the tattoo artist does not harm the person who desires to get a tattoo, then 
consent would not function as a justification in such cases, given that the victim's consent would 
actually reveal that there is no harm in need of justification in the first place. 
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outweighed by the value that we place in allowing the victim to freely and 
autonomously decide what to do with her body. Consent, therefore, does not 
negate the harm inflicted by conduct constitutive of these offenses. It justifies it. 13 
Although plausible, the claim that consent operates as a justification defense 
in cases of battery is problematic. It is confusing to contend that the interest 
sought to be protected by these offenses is the prevention of physical harm to the 
person while simultaneously holding that the infliction of physical harm is justified 
by the victim's consent because the law values the person's freedom to decide 
what to do with her body more than it values the person's interest in the integrity 
of her body. If it is really the case that the victim's freedom to decide what to do 
with her body is more important to us than whether her body is physically harmed, 
then it would be more sensible to conclude that what the law really seeks to protect 
by creating the offense of battery is not the individual's interest in keeping her 
body free from harm, but rather her interest in having the freedom to do whatever 
she wants to do with her body. 
It is, of course, true that physically harming an individual's body usually 
interferes with her interest in being free to decide what to do with her body. 
However, this is only the case because we assume (sometimes incorrectly) that 
people usually do not want to suffer physical pain. Nevertheless, if what we 
ultimately care about the most is protecting the individual's right. to freely decide 
what to do with her body, we should be prepared to recognize that consent to harm 
does not amount to a waiver of the victim's rights. Rather, consent to harm allows 
the victim to exercise her right to do as she wishes with her body. So conceived, 
consent negates the occurrence of legally relevant harm instead of justifying its 
infliction. 
Another reason why consent should not operate as a justification is that 
justifications defeat liability whenever the actor inflicts a harm to prevent an equal 
or greater harm. This, as Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code suggests,14 is the 
gist of all claims of justification. Thus, deadly force used pursuant to law 
enforcement authority is deemed justified only when the official infliction of 
physical harm is necessary in order to prevent an equal or greater harm. 
Consequently, an officer can use deadly force to prevent a suspect from engaging 
in conduct that jeopardizes the lives or bodily integrity of others. IS However, she 
cannot use deadly force in order to prevent a non-dangerous suspect from fleeing. 16 
Similarly, an individual can use deadly force against an aggressor in self-defense 
only in order to ward off the use of deadly force. 17 Finally, and more obviously, an 
13 This is the view defended by Professor Fletcher. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC 
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1998). 
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) ("Justification Generally: Choice of Evils"). 
15 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,383-84 (2007). 
16 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,21 (1985). 
17 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) (explaining that the actor must believe her 
conduct is necessary to avoid a greater harm and the selected course of action must also be the only 
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actor acts lawfully pursuant to the lesser evils justification only when she inflicts 
hann in order to avoid an even greater hann, such as when she burns a fann in 
order to create a firebreak so as to protect a neighboring town from being 
consumed by the flames of a raging fire. 18 These cases illustrate the basic principle 
that an individual acts justifiably only when she has engaged in hannful conduct in 
order to avert equally or more hannful conduct. 
This is not what happens in the case of consent, unless one is willing to 
conclude that the perpetrator's physically hannful conduct is justified because by 
securing the victim's consent the perpetrator inflicts lesser evil than the one 
caused. This is absurd for two reasons. First, for the reasons previously discussed, 
it is unclear whether the perpetrator's conduct truly amounts to the infliction of an 
"evil" upon the victim when the victim freely consented to the act. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the 
perpetrator's conduct counts as an evil inflicted upon the victim, it is borderline 
incoherent to contend that the infliction of such an evil on the victim is justified 
because it averts the evil of not acquiescing to the victim's wishes. If not 
acquiescing to the victim's wishes is an evil, then agreeing to do what the victim 
wants the perpetrator to do simply should not count as an evil at all. 19 No matter 
how you look at it, consent does not fit within the general category of justification 
defenses. 
III. AUTONOMY, DIGNITY AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY 
A. Autonomy and Battery 
Liberal criminal theorists believe that the protection of personal autonomy lies 
at the core of modem criminal law. This has led several scholars to develop a 
sophisticated defense of an autonomy-centered criminallaw.2o According to these 
scholars, conduct should be made criminal if, and only if, it interferes with an 
individual's autonomy.21 Vera Bergelson recently defended a more robust role for 
the protection of autonomy in the criminal law.22 For Bergelson, respect for the 
victim's autonomy entails not only punishing those who unjustifiably interfere 
alternative to lawful actions). 
18 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) (explaining that the hann or evil sought to 
be avoided must be greater than that sought to be prevented). 
19 Professor Robinson agrees with this conclusion because he believes, as I do, that "[c]onsent 
does not outweigh a hann done, but rather refines the specific definition of the hann in the particular 
offense to say that no hann has been done." Robinson, supra note 7, at 212, note 53. 
20 See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
VICTIMS' RIGHTS, 153-54 (2002). 
21 Vera Bergelson, Autonomy, Dignity and Consent to Harm, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 724, 729 
(2008). 
22 BERGELSON, supra note 1, at 67. 
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with the autonomy of others, but also fully or partially exculpating those who hann 
the victim because the victim freely and autonomously desired to be hanned.23 
This led Bergelson to argue that the victim's consent should be a full or partial 
defense to all crimes, including aggravated battery.24 This, however, leads to a 
puzzle. If the legally protected interest in cases of battery is really personal 
autonomy, then why is it that consent is not a defense to such crimes? 
There are at least two possible answers to this question. First, it can be argued 
that consent is not a defense to such crimes but it should be, at least if personal 
autonomy is to be taken seriously. On the other hand, it can be argued that as 
important as personal autonomy is to the criminal law, there is another value that is 
equally or more important to the criminal law that militates in favor of 
criminalizing certain hannful conduct even if it is consensual. That value is human 
dignity. This is Bergelson's preferred approach.25 Thus, Bergelson suggests that 
consent to maiming for the purposes of cannibalizing severed body parts should 
not be a defense to battery.26 By cannibalizing the victim's body parts the 
perpetrator treats her like a piece of food. Such conduct ought to be punished 
because it denies the victim's humanity and violates her dignity. 
B. Dignity and Battery 
One could object to Bergelson's solution by pointing out that perhaps the 
victim's consent to the cannibalistic experience amounts not only to a waiver of 
her right to physical integrity, but also of her right to human dignity. However, 
Bergelson contends that the right to human dignity is not waivable, given that it 
stems from the very fact that we are human beings.27 This solution strikes me as 
mysterious and unnecessarily complex. Why should we accept the proposition that 
an individual can "waive" her right to physical integrity as a way of exercising her 
autonomy but cannot ''waive'' her right to dignity as a way of exercising her 
autonomy? If what we ultimately want to argue is that battery should sometimes 
be punished regardless of the victim's consent, isn't it better to just acknowledge 
that the right to physical integrity is sometimes not waivable instead of invoking 
the contrived concept of human dignity and then suggesting that the right to 
physical integrity is waivable but not the right to human dignity? Despite its 
appeal, Bergelson rejects this solution, contending that suggesting that the right to 
physical integrity is not waivable is tantamount to adopting the "authoritarian," 
"absolute," and "arbitrary" view that a person's body does not belong to her but 
rather to some sort of collective entity such as the state or society.28 The problem 
23 Id. 
24 !d. 
25 Id. at 65. 
26 Id. at 67. 
27 Id. at 66. 
28 Berge1son, supra note 21, at 727. 
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with Bergelson's argument is that it seems to equally apply to the concept of 
human dignity. After all, if a person cannot waive her right to dignity it must be 
because it ultimately does not belong to her but rather to society or some other sort 
of collective entity. 
Bergelson defends the non-waivable character of human dignity by pointing 
out that dignity is "an essential characteristic of all human beings" and that it's 
essential for "our collective humanity.,,29 Unfortunately, this does not establish the 
non-waivable nature of the so-called right to human dignity. Life is also an 
essential characteristic of all human beings (and less mysterious than human 
dignity), but Bergelson argues that the right to life is waivable.30 What explains 
the difference? Maybe dignity is more important than life itself. This would be an 
odd proposition, given that, without life, discussions about human dignity seem to 
be out of place. Perhaps it is true that there is such a thing as human dignity and 
that it is even more essential than life to "our collective humanity." This, however, 
is a proposition that must be proven, not assumed. 
C. Socially Acceptable Conduct and Battery 
If appealing to autonomy and human dignity does not explain why consent is 
not a defense to (some kinds) of battery, is there an alternative explanation? 
Fortunately, there is, and it is not as mysterious as the concept of human dignity. 
Consent is not a defense to certain batteries because, in addition to promoting 
personal autonomy, the criminal law also cares about encouraging certain types of 
socially acceptable conduct and discouraging certain socially unacceptable acts. 
Thus, our current criminal laws allow parents to pierce the ears of their baby girls, 
but do not authorize them to tattoo their children.3l They allow boxers and mixed 
martial arts fighters to beat each other to a pulp in the ring or cage, but do not 
authorize the general citizenry to engage in street fights or barroom brawls. Our 
current criminal law authorizes the severing of body parts for the purposes of a sex 
change operation, but not for the purposes of satisfYing the desires of those who 
suffer from body dismorphic disorder.32 What these laws have in common is that 
they criminalize conduct that for some reason or another is deemed to be socially 
unacceptable (tattooing children, street fighting, and the severing of body parts to 
treat body dismorphic disorder), while it authorizes conduct that is considered to 
be socially acceptable (piercing ears of newborn girls, boxing and mixed martial 
arts fighting, and severing body parts for the purpose of a sex change operation). 
29 BERGELSON, supra note I, at 66. 
30 [d. at 93-94. 
31 A couple in Georgia was recently charged criminally for tattooing six of their seven 
children despite the fact that both the parents and the children consented to the procedure. See Brett 
Singer, Parents Arrested for Giving Their Kids Home Tattoos, PARENT DISH (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.parentdish.coml20 I 0/0 I 104/parents-arrested-for -gi ving -their -kids-home-tattoos!. 
32 BERGELSON, supra note I, at 24. 
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While some of these distinctions might seem arbitrary to some, others, like the 
prohibition of street fighting and barroom brawls, seem particularly 
uncontroversial. 
Bergelson claims that it is arbitrary to disallow consent as a defense to battery 
when physical harm is inflicted pursuant to sadomasochistic sexual activities, 
while allowing it as a defense when physical harm is inflicted pursuant to religious 
flagellation.33 If personal autonomy is taken to be the legally protected interest in 
these cases, then Bergelson is surely right, for in both cases the victim has decided 
that she wants to suffer physical harm and not giving full effect to such desires 
stifles her autonomy. However, the arbitrariness dissipates if one takes the legally 
protected interest in these cases to be not the protection of autonomy, but rather the 
encouragement of socially acceptable activities and discouragement of socially 
unacceptable conduct. For better or worse, sadomasochistic sex is considered by 
and large to be a socially unacceptable activity, while religious ~ractices are 
generally considered to be acceptable even if they are somewhat odd. 4 Similarly, 
severing the genital organs of a patient in order to perform a sex-change operation 
is considered socially acceptable (and lawful) because medical professionals agree 
that this is a procedure with a legitimate medical purpose?5 Contrarily, severing 
body parts in order to satisfy the desires of someone who suffers from body 
dismorphic disorder is considered socially unacceptable (and unlawful) because 
most medical professionals believe that such a procedure lacks a legitimate 
medical purpose.36 
IV. IF CONSENT IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION, THEN WHAT IS IT? 
A. Consent as an Offense-Modification Defense 
Sometimes the absence of consent is an element of an offense. When this is 
the case, consent uncontroversially defeats criminal liability because it negates an 
essential element of the crime. However, there seem to be cases when consent 
defeats criminal liability even though it does not appear to negate an element of the 
33 /d. at 21-22. 
34 I am aware that distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct in the context of battery by 
looking at the social acceptability of the act might lead to legal moralism. While legal moralism is 
perhaps normatively unappealing, I have little doubt that, as a descriptive matter, it succeeds quite 
well in coherently explaining the ways in which the law draws lines between lawful and unlawful 
inflictions of physical harm. Given that my aim is to provide a descriptively accurate account of the 
relevance of consent to the law of battery, I do not examine the normative appeal of this account here. 
3S It is reasonable to assume that in cases involving medical procedures, the social 
acceptability (and lawfulness) of consensual acts usually hinges on professional judgments about the 
legitimacy of the conduct, given that the general citizenry lacks the knowledge and training that is 
necessary to evaluate the legitimacy of such procedures. 
36 See generally Jesse Ellison, Cutting Desire, NEWSWEEK (May 28, 2008), 
http://www.newsweek.com/idlI38932. 
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offense. Paradigmatic examples include consenting to cosmetic surgery, getting a 
tattoo, and engaging in a boxing match. In all of these cases, the conduct of the 
perpetrator seems to satisfy the elements of the offense of battery, for the doctor 
who cuts into the patient's body, the tattoo artist who inserts a needle into the 
client's arm and the boxer who lands a right uppercut to the face of his opponent 
all "cause bodily injury to another.,,37 In such cases, the conventional view is that 
consent functions as a justification that defeats criminal liability in spite of the fact 
that the perpetrator's conduct satisfied the elements of an offense and thus caused 
the type of harm that is sought to be prevented by the creation of the offense. I 
have argued that this view is wrong because, if the harm sought to be prevented by 
the offense of battery is the interference with the person's freedom to decide what 
to do with her body, then the victim's consent negates the causation of the harm in 
the first place rather than justify its infliction. If, on the other hand, the harm 
sought to be prevented by the offense is the protection of the bodily integrity of the 
individual, then the victim's consent is irrelevant and does not therefore justify 
causing bodily harm. 
Nevertheless, I agree that bodily harm caused as a result of cosmetic surgery, 
tattooing and boxing is not punishable. However, I believe that the exclusion of 
liability is a result not of justification, but of the social acceptability of the conduct. 
Therefore, I submit that in these cases consent functions as an "offense-
modification" defense that defeats liability for conduct that appears to satisfy the 
elements of the offense of battery by revealing that the perpetrator's conduct failed 
to cause the social harm that the offense of battery seeks to prevent. 38 In other 
words, performing cosmetic surgery, piercing someone else's ears at their request, 
and engaging in a boxing match are simply not the type of conduct that the 
legislature desired to make criminal when it drafted the offense of battery.39 
Consequently, such conduct should be considered lawful because the underlying 
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1962). 
38 A similar solution has been defended by several German criminal theorists. See, e.g., 
CLAUS ROXIN, I DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 517 (Luzon Pena, et aI., trans., 2000). 
39 Instead of arguing that the social acceptability of the conduct functions as an offense-
modification defense, it could be contended that the social acceptability of the conduct should operate 
as a kind of justification that is not based on the idea of choosing the lesser evil. Therefore, it could 
be argued that ear piercing or tattooing is not punishable because it is justified pursuant to the social 
acceptability of the conduct rather than because engaging in such conduct prevents a greater evil. 
The problem with this claim is that justifications defeat liability for engaging in conduct that should 
be avoided whenever possible. Therefore, the justification of self-defense defeats liability for killing 
a child or a psychotic aggressor. See generally George P. Fletcher & Luis E. Chiesa, Self-Defense 
and the Psychotic Aggressor, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 365 (paul Robinson, Kim Ferzan, 
and Stephen Garvey eds., 2010). Nevertheless, engaging in such justified conduct (killing a child or 
an insane person) ought to be avoided if possible. Contrarily, piercing someone else's ears with their 
consent, tattooing their arm, or landing an uppercut on an opponent during a boxing match does not 
amount to conduct that should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, what makes these acts lawful is 
that, contrary to what happens in cases of justified conduct, engaging in such acts does not create a 
regrettable state of affairs that is in need of special justification. 
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conduct is not socially hannful in any meaningful way rather than because it is an 
instance of justifiable infliction of socially relevant hann.4o More importantly, 
what ultimately detennines the non-criminal nature of these acts is not the victim's 
consent, but rather the social acceptability of the conduct. Consent in most of 
these cases is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for detennining whether 
the conduct is socially acceptable. Thus, consent is a factor amongst many others 
that should be taken into account in order to detennine whether the defendant 
should not be punished because he did not cause the kind of hann that society 
sought to prevent when it enacted the prohibition against battery.41 
B. What Interest Does the Offense of Battery Seek to Protect and When is Consent 
Relevant to Determining Whether the Interest Has Been Infringed? 
1. Battery Does Not Seek to Protect Autonomy 
As a general rule, an offense seeks to protect individual autonomy when it 
includes the absence of consent as an element of the offense. When someone 
consents to engage in certain conduct she is exercising her autonomy to do as she 
wishes. Therefore, if non-consent is an element of the offense, it is reasonable to 
assume that the interest sought to be protected by the offense is the person's 
autonomy to decide what to do with certain bodily or property interests. In 
contrast, when the absence of consent is not considered an offense element, it is 
generally because the interest sought to be protected by the crime is something 
40 The Gennan criminal theorist Hans Welzel championed a similar solution. Welzel argued 
that conduct that is considered "socially adequate" unaer the circumstances should not be punished 
even if it nominally satisfies the elements of the offense charged. HANs WELZEL, DERECHO PENAL 
ALEMAN 66 (Bustos Ramirez et aI., trans., 1997). 
41 This account of consent as an offense-modification defense is compatible with the Model 
Penal Code's general approach to the doctrine of consent. Pursuant to § 2.11(1) of the Code, the 
consent of the victim is relevant to criminal liability if it "negatives an element of the offense" or 
"precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." 
The Code then fleshes out several instances in which consent precludes the infliction of the kind of 
harm sought to be prevented by the offense of battery. These include consent to non-serious harm 
and consent to engage in lawful sports and other concerted activities not prohibited by law. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (1962). 
The Code, however, considers consent to recognized Conns of medical treatment to amount to a 
justification to engage in conduct that satisfies the elements of the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 
3.08(4) (1962). It is unclear why the drafters of the Model Penal Code believed that consent to 
engage in lawful sports and other lawful concerted activities (tattooing, piercing) negates the sort of 
evil that the legislature intended to prohibit as battery, whereas consent to medical treatment justifies 
engaging in conduct that inflicts the kind of hann sought to be prevented by the offense. Why, for 
example, is the insertion of a needle to get a tattoo treated as a case in which no legally relevant hann 
has been caused (§ 2.11(2», while the insertion of a needle to extract a blood sample is treated as a 
case in which legally relevant hann has been caused but the infliction of such harm is justified by 
countervailing considerations (§ 3.08(4»? Assuming that the victims consented to the conduct and 
that the physical harm inflicted in both cases is the same, the Model Penal Code's distinction seems 
arbitrary. 
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other than personal autonomy. Therefore, it is sensible to conclude that personal 
autonomy is not the interest sought to be protected by the offense of battery, given 
that non-consent to the physical harm is not an element of the crime. Why else 
would the legislature fail to specify that the victim's consent defeats criminal 
liability for battery? In such cases, it is reasonable to assume that, absent strong 
evidence to the contrary, the reason for the prohibition is protecting some socially 
valuable interest other than the victim's autonomy. 
2. Battery as a Protection Against Non-Trivial Inflictions of Physical Harm 
Pursuant to Socially Unacceptable Activities 
If battery does not seek to protect autonomy, then the most obvious 
conclusion is that it seeks to protect individuals against the infliction of physical 
harm. However, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to prohibit all harmful 
physical contacts as batteries. Take, for example, the acts of piercing the ear of a 
baby girl, slamming into the catcher while trying to be safe at home plate, and 
tackling the quarterback in football. In all of these cases a person may cause 
physical harm to another person. Nevertheless, it would be odd to conclude that 
the legislature intended to prohibit these acts as instances of battery. Perhaps it 
could be argued that these acts should count as battery but that they should not be 
punished because the infliction of legally relevant harm in such instances is 
justified because it prevents an equal or greater evil. This would also be odd, 
unless one is willing to accept that not being able to decorate a baby's body with 
earrings, foregoing a run in baseball, and failing to force a fumble in football 
amount to greater evils than inflicting physical harm to a person. Rather than 
defending these unappealing propositions, it is more sensible to conclude that such 
acts do not really fall within the scope of conduct that was intended to be 
prohibited as battery. 
As a result, the offense of battery should be understood as seeking to prevent 
the infliction of non-trivial physical harm in circumstances where the infliction of 
such harm is not considered a normal occurrence given current societal practices. 
The infliction of trivial harm is not socially unacceptable because it amounts to a 
de minimis infraction42 that is to be expected and tolerated as a result of living in 
what Professors Prosser and Keeton called our "crowded world.'.43 Furthermore, 
the infliction of non-trivial harm that is a normal occurrence according to current 
societal practices is not socially unacceptable because it does not amount to an 
extraordinary or regrettable event that is in need of special justification. In such 
cases the opposite is true, given that in light of current societal practices the 
infliction of such bodily harm is considered to be a normal part of everyday life. 
42 So-called de minimis infractions should not be criminal. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 
(1962). 
43 DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, W. PAGE KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9,42 (5th ed. 1984). 
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Physical harm caused as a result of body piercing and tattooing, cosmetic surgery 
and sporting activities constitute paradigmatic examples. Finally, I believe that the 
consensual nature of these activities is relevant to explaining why they are 
considered to be a normal part of everyday life. Ultimately, however, what makes 
these activities a normal part of life is not that they are consensual, but rather that 
they are undertaken pursuant to generally accepted societal and/or professional 
practices. 
v. CONCLUSION 
There is general agreement that consent is sometimes relevant to ascertaining 
a defendant's liability for battery. Most scholars believe that in such cases consent 
operates as a justification that relieves the actor of liability for conduct that 
admittedly satisfies the offense elements of battery. In this brief essay I have 
argued that this view is mistaken. Properly understood, consent does not justify 
the infliction of physical harm. Rather, consent is relevant to battery liability 
when, in conjunction with other factors, it modifies the definition of the crime in a 
way that reveals that the defendant's act does not actually fall within the range of 
conduct prohibited by the offense. 
